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Introduction 
   For its inability to achieve rational land use and control land price inflation in the fast-
.growing metropolitan areas, Japan's land policy has been branded by most experts as a failure. 
Most economists blame government intervention and regulation as causing perennial 
shortages in land supply. Specifically, low property tax and rigid regulations such as the 
height regulation of the building code induce land owners to hold land as an asset for capital 
gains rather than to sell or use it for profitable purposes. City planners blame loose city 
planning regulations and lack of enforcement mechanisms for the chaotic urban development 
and land price spiral that spread rapidly from commercial to residential to vacant industrial 
land in the latest land boom. In short, economists blame the state's regulation while city 
planners blame the state's inaction for a host of land problems in Japan. 
   I take a third view that attributes a pivotal cause of Japan's land problems to the state's 
failure to establish separate land markets for agricultural, residential, commercial, and 
industrial uses by clearly demarcating and enforcing zoning divisions. Each market, if zoning 
lines are clearly demarcated and enforced, will have a set of players with similar needs and 
goals and a separate price mechanism in play in each market. Fair competition is ensured 
among players of more or less equal footing to prevent such abnormal occurrences like 
Japan's land bubble in the late 1980s which inflated the price of metropolitan and urban 
residential land beyond the reach of the average working citizen. 
    This failure, in turn, is to be explained by a combination of factors. Of central importance 
is the power structure of the Japanese state. In other words, the policies related to land use 
and land prices were determined ultimately by the composition and balance of power among 
major actors in the relevant policymaking process. The relevant policies encompass monetary, 
financial, and tax policies as well as measures dealing specifically with zoning, city planning, 
land development and the like. During the rapid urbanization in Japan, it was mainly 
economic policy that determined the land use and land prices rather than the policies 
specifically designed to control land use or land price or to improve housing conditions. The 
priority placed on economic growth was based on the tacit consensus among leading 
politicians, bureaucrats, and politically influential social-economic groups. Until roughly the 
mid-1960s, the public also seemed to have no objections to the view that economic recovery 
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and growth were the preconditions for achieving better quality of life and living environment. 
   In terms of land problems and policy agendas, the postwar era can be divided into five 
periods:1 
   (1) Immediate Postwar Reconstruction Period, 1945-54 
   (2) Urbanization/Pre-Basic Planning Law Period, 1955-1967 
   (3) Basic Land Use Legislation Period, 1968-1987 
   (4) Deregulation/Land Bubble Period, 1982-1990 
   (5) Post-Bubble Period, 1990-
   For each period, the interaction of the state and the market at the domestic and 
international levels will be examined focusing on housing, housing land development, city 
planning/ building regulations, and land tax. Housing prices, conditions, and environment 
have, to a significant degree, defined the lifestyle as well as the quality of life of the urban 
work force. 2 As mentioned earlier, among the important elements to be examined in this 
context are the saving, consumption, and investment patterns. The paper examines how the 
state and market forces have interacted to create and perpetuate the neo- social dumping 
system and how, in turn, that system has interacted with the external forces, either state or 
market. What would be the prospects for change in Japan's land policy and social dumping 
system? My view is that significant changes are bound to occur and there will be good 
chances for correcting some of the land problems in Japan. This is so ultimately because the 
system is so closely linked to the global political economy that it will inevitably be exposed 
to and transformed by the market forces and the pressures from Japan's business partners. 
I . Overview of the Postwar Land Problems and Policies 
A. Postwar Reconstruction Period: 1945-1954 
    The first period was marked by a combination of Occupation- inspired agricultural land 
reform, zaibatsu resolution, "liberalization" or rather blatant deregulation in the field of real 
estate business. 
   With about one third of the nation's housing stock destroyed during the war, the 
government started housing policy with a newly created Housing Corporation (Jutaku eidan) 
and local governments as two institutional pillars. The former, however, was disbanded by the 
Occupation authorities toward the end of 1946. For the reason that there was already a budget 
for subsidizing housing construction, the Ministry of Finance rejected the proposal made by 
the War Damages Reconstruction Agency (Sensai fukko-in) to more systematically promote 
housing construction for average citizens by transferring decision-making authorities to 
prefectural and municipal governments. Also rejected by MOF was the proposal made by 
Ichizo Kobayashi, the first president of fukkoin for the government to purchase war-damaged 
land to increase the publicly-owned land stock by issuing land-bonds (tochi saiken) to prepare 
for the land problems which he predicted to come in the near future. The Reconstruction 
Agency called for the construction of 4.5 million housing units per year. But the actual
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number built was far below the target. Evidently, the Japanese officials did not regard 
housing policy as an integral part of social policy.3 This contrasts sharply with the West 
German government's policy which gave a high priority to housing policy. 
   In 1948, the Ministry of Construction was established by combining the Reconstruction 
Agency and the National Land Bureau of the disbanded Home Affairs Ministry. In 1949, the 
Housing Finance Corporation (Jutaku kinyu koko) was established to start long-term low 
interest housing loans for individual and corporate housing construction. 
   According to the Japan Real Estate Institute, the residential land prices in the six 
metropolitan cities increased on average 63.3 percent per year and commercial land, 81.9 
percent during this decade (1945-55). The rapidly increasing demand for land was met with 
"deregulation" allegedly to ensure the freedom of the individual to choose his or her 
occupation (by removing the qualification requirements for entering into the real estate 
business). The influx of unqualified real estate brokers and their aggressive and often 
undisciplined sales (and resales) activities contributed to the steep land price hikes during the 
chaotic postwar decade. This was an era of small and medium brokers. The larger real estate 
4 firms were still suffering f omthe after-effects of zalbatsu dissolution. In 1952, finally, the 
Residential Land Business Law (Takuchi tatemono torihiki ho) was enacted to make registration 
of real estate brokers obligatory to curb the chaotic situation in the business.' 
   Other major legislative actions include a War-Damaged Cities Reconstruction Plan 
(1945-50), the agricultural land reform (1946-50), and rent control. There were also some 
aborted attempts to adopt residential land law (1947) and to revise the city planning law 
(1950). 
   The Reconstruction Plan was adopted as a guide for rebuilding cities ravaged by the war. 
The plan was intended "to restrain the growth of oversized cities and to develop local cities 
of small and medium sizes." It provided for boundary adjustments and requisitions by local 
authorities. The planning standards included one for green belts, a detailed zoning code, and 
strict building control measures. Tokyo, which accounted for 26.6% of the plan's land area, 
was given a chance to rationalize its land use patterns. 
   Because of the severe reduction in the central government subsidy under the Dodge Line 
austerity policy and the affected residents' resistance, however, the plan was implemented in 
only 6.8% of the planned area in Tokyo in contrast to 61.2% of the areas in Japan as a whole. 
The Allied Occupation was of an opinion that the reconstruction plan was too luxurious for a 
defeated country. 6 
   The agricultural land reform, implemented under the authority and sponsorship of the 
Allied Occupation, was the most important reform affecting the development of land policy in 
postwar Japan. About six million small owner-farmers, each with about 2 acres, were created 
by the reform which placed a ceiling of three cho (1 cho is about 2.5 acres) on individual 
farmland holdings. To protect he newly created class of owner-farmers, the Agricultural Land 
Law of 1952 made conversion from agricultural to other uses subject to the approval of a 
prefectural governor or the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. It was in force until its 
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revision in 1970 to facilitate more productive large- scale agricultural operations .7 The land 
reform created a large, stable support base for conservative politicians, who won't support any 
8 land use control measures against farmers' opposition. 
   In 1947, by legislating a basic law, the Japanese planning bureaucracy attempted to 
empower the government to acquire land for such purposes as readjusting boundaries, and 
constructing roads, city water supply facilities, greenery zones, and housing for common 
people (shomin jutaku). The bill called for citizen participation and stabilization of residential 
land prices. The Allied Occupation opposed the enactment of this bill.9 
   Also aborted was an attempt by a Ministry of Construction's (MOC) advisory committee 
to revise the City Planning Law of 1918. The main reason, this time, seemed to have been 
inter- ministerial rivalry (MOC vs. the Ministry of Home Affairs) and the central bureaucracy I s 
mistrust of local autonomy. Emergency measures such as freezing of the housing and land 
rent10 had also influenced land use and ownership patterns.11 
B. Urbanization without Basic Land Law: 1955-1967 
   Thus, urbanization occurred without a vision or basic laws to guide and control the 
growth of the cities. The government was preoccupied with building the industrial base and 
infrastructure to support heavy and chemical industrialization. A 10-year housing plan 
announced by the Hatoyama Cabinet in 1955 was designed to house massive flows of 
immigrants from the rural areas. It called for building 4.8 million houses between 1955 and 
1964 to achieve "one house one household" goal. To support this plan, the Japan Housing 
Corporation was established in July 1955 with joint capitalization by the central and local 
governments and insurance companies. 
   However, with continued rural-urban migration of workers, the housing shortage remained 
acute. In 1959, still 1.8 million additional units were needed, according to the MOC data. 
Under the rapidly growing demand, the housing land boom continued and expanded to an area 
as far as 30-40 kin from central Tokyo. Small and medium developers remained core actors. 
Housing land development was primitive and often involved false advertisements and dubious 
business practices on the verge of illegality. 
   Heavy and chemical industries mushroomed on cheap imported oil in the Pacific coastal 
region. The population in the Tokyo metropolitan area increased from 13 million in 1955 to 
over 30 million in 1970. 12 A government attempt in the mid-1950s to build a green belt 
around inner city area and new town outside that belt, the idea borrowed from the 1944 
Greater London Plan, failed dismally, because of the strong opposition by the farmers who 
owned land. 13 
   Residential areas were expanded rapidly often without adequate roads, parks, or sewers, 
interspersed with factories, retail stores and patches of farmlands. No zoning meant that 
industrial and commercial bidders competed with individual buyers of housing land in the 
same land market. Between 1955 and 1985, the average residential land prices increased at 
more than three times the rate of wage increases. This land price inflation vis a vis wages 
compelled the urban workers wishing to buy a house to save over 20% of their disposable
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income during the high economic growth period. The MOF had discouraged the development 
of consumer finance until the mid-1970s when big businesses ceased to depend on bank loans. 
Huge savings squeezed from the household sector were then channeled by government 
subsidies and tax policies into the corporate sector.14 
   The Ministry of Finance maintained artificially low ceilings on deposit rates to enable 
low interest loans to corporate borrowers. Land prices rose at more than double the regulated 
interest rates. Land became the best collateral for bank loans. Since land ownership promised 
far higher yields than bank deposits, many people borrowed money to buy land as a way to 
build an asset. 15 The LDP government also encouraged home ownership which is believed to 
make voters conservative. As a result, the majority (61 percent nationwide; 40 percent in 
Tokyo) of Japanese households have become homeowners of some sort.16 Politicians in both 
ruling and opposition parties became increasingly reluctant to support land policy measures 
limiting property rights. Land owners became increasingly unwilling to sell their land. Land 
sales were further discouraged by a high sales tax. A constant shortage of land relative to 
demand generated perennial pressure for further land price increases. The price of commercial 
and residential land in Tokyo rose tenfold from 1977 to 1988. The "land myth" - a belief 
that land prices will keep rising forever - became an essential part of Japan's economic-
growth machine. The critical role played by rising land prices in Japan's economy led 
analyslts to characaterize the Japanese economy as a "land-standard," rather than a gold-
standarad, system. 17 
   Until mid-1960s, the goal of the LDP government was economic growth. They were more 
concerned with a growing gap between urban and rural areas and how to stem the tide of 
massive rural-urban migration and create enough jobs and revenue sources in the increasingly 
deserted rural areas. Urban sprawl was not an important issue yet. Japan's urbanization 
continued at a breakneck pace without effective urban planning or concern for urban 
amenities. 
    It was local governments that initiated policies to give some order in the urbanization 
process. As in the case of the Kobe city's Cliff Ordinance of 1960, the central government 
adopted some of these ideas. 18 
   It was not until 1964, however, that the national government finally enacted regulations, 
on housing land development - such as the minimum standards regarding the sizes of roads, 
green areas and parks - within the governor-designated development regulation areas. Almost 
the entire Tokyo metropolitan region was designated as a regulation area. 
   This law was a severe blow to small and medium developers but a blessing for bigger 
developers. The Japan Housing Land Development Association, an industry group of small 
and medium developers, lost its membership from 65 in 1967 to 18 three years later. The 
membership of the Real Estate Association of larger firms, almost doubled for the period. 
   Although the quality of housing land improved, the costs of development and hence the 
land prices soared. The Real Estate Evaluation System introduced in 1963 was intended to 
control land price hikes, but it was not mandatory to use this system in a transaction. The 
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system was used mainly in legal disputes and did not have any restraining effect on land 
prices. 
   The government adopted measures to expand housing loans. The increased demand for 
housing land pushed land prices further up. The surveys indicated that 76 percent of the 
people who bought houses using loans from the Public Housing Corporation owned the 
housing lots already. The constantly rising land prices made it increasingly hard for those 
without land to build a house.19 
C. The State Turns to Active Land Policy: 1968-87 
   In the 1960s, frustrated voters began electing reformist mayors, local council members, 
and governors in the metropolitan and urban areas. It was a sense of crisis that prompted the 
LDP to pay attention to the worsening metropolitan land problems. 
   In the late 1960s, a formal legal framework for systematic city planning was finally set up 
with the legislation of the New City Planning Law (1968), the revised Building Standard Law 
                                       20 (1970), and a series of land related laws. Conceding to the demands of developers and 
farmers, the original idea proposed by the advisory council was considerably watered down, 21 
and the authority of municipal governments and citizen participation in city planning was still 
           22 very limited. 
   For the first time, the government used tax measures to control land prices, but the 
results were disastrous. By reducing land sales tax, the government anticipated increased land 
supply and stabilization of land prices. As the law did not apply to the corporate land 
transactions, and the timing coincided with the high corporate liquidity caused by the 
expansive monetary and fiscal policies, the policy created not only land-based instant 
millionalres23 but also the nationwide land speculation, which was further fueled by The 
Remodeling of the Japanese Archipelago, an instant best-seller revealed in June 1972 by Kakuei 
Tanaka, then Minister of International Trade and Industry. Railroad companies, developers, 
and builders were Joined by trading companies and banks in gobbling up tracts large enough 
to exert monopoly power in the area to drive up land prices. The financial institutions played 
a central role by financing their own as well as corporate land speculation, often through 
subsidiaries. 
   Skyrocketed land prices spawned sharp criticism of the Tanaka government and the 
remodeling plan among the public, the mass media, and opposition parties, and even within 
financial and industrial circles and the LDP. The LDP lost seats in the Lower House election 
in December 1972 and belatedly adopted a corporate land transaction tax and a special 
corporate land-holding tax to restrain and punish corporate land speculation. 
   Attempts to raise the tax rates on tracts of agricultural land in the Urbanization 
Promotion Area (UPA) to the same level as those on residential land in neighboring areas 
(takuchl naml kazei) faced strong opposition from the National Association of Agricultural 
Cooperatives (Nokyo). Repeatedly the implementation of the residential rate taxes were 
postponed by yielding to the farm groups I opposition. 
   To coordinate land-related policymaking authority, previously fragmented among various
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ministries, the Tanaka administration introduced the National Land Agency (NLA) and 
enacted the National Land Use Planning Law (NLUPL) .14 The new law has authorized 
prefectural governors to suspend or recommend changes in land sales in certain cases, if, for 
example, a proposed transaction failed to meet the standards set for the price and prospective 
use of the land, infrastructure, environmental protection, etc.; to designate "controlled areas" 
(kisei kuiki) where speculative land purchases have driven up land prices, and subsequently 
freeze land prices or declare land sales subject to government approval. The government was 
empowered to exercise greater supervisory power over land sales through preliminary 
investigations into the state of potential controlled areas; and to designate an idle land (yukyu 
tochl seido) within which the governor could notify an owner of his duty to use idle land 
efficiently, either voluntarily or according to a plan developed at the advice of the governor. 
The recurrence of land boom in the late 1980s proved, however, the ineffectiveness of the 
legal and institutional framework introduced in the early 1970s in changing the fundamental 
structure of the land-standard system analyzed earlier. 
D. Deregulation/Land Bubble Era: 1982-1990 
   The steep stock and land price inflation between 1085 and 1989 made Japan an "asset 
superpower."25 The land price spiral was largely triggered by a perceived acute shortage of 
office space in the face of a rapidly increasing demand stemming from Tokyo's emergence as 
a global financial services center. But many analysts trace the origin of the bubble to 
Nakasone administration's deregulation policy conducted as part of its administrative reform. 
To overcome the threat of a recession posed by the revaluation of the yen through industrial 
restructuring and rationalization; and to respond to United States pressure to expand domestic 
demand, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) adopted easy money policy, for which it later admitted 
misjudgment on the timing to quit. The Nakasone administration promoted the idea of 
minkatsu [it literally means "private sector vitality"] (1. e., using private sector resources in 
public infrastructure- building and urban redevelopment projects) It was a device to achieve 
two conflicting goals: one for fiscal and administrative reforms to reduce the budget deficit, 
and the other to increase domestic demand to meet the US demand. To cut back government 
spending for public works projects, minkatsu idea was to stimulate private-sector participation 
with a variety of incentives, including deregulation in urban redevelopment. The idea 
coincided with the demands of the depressed industries, such as steel, cement, construction, 
and real estate, that wanted to use their excess capacity in lucrative construction contracts for 
high-rise buildings, roads, bridges, etc. 26 
    To stimulate private sector investment, the Nakasone government started the sales of 
public lands in choice locations in and around Tokyo. Such urban public land sales usually 
require prior approval of detailed plans for their use provided by sellers in most European 
countries and by buyers in the United States. 17 Japanese public land sales were not 
accompanied by such plans and were often made at two to four times market prices. Critics 
blame these sales for triggering the price escalation in central Tokyo. Also, in most Western 
countries, to improve housing and a variety of public facilities, local governments are often 
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given the preemptive and compulsory purchase powers in the case of public land sales .18 By 
contrast, Japan's local governments have to compete with private sector buyers. 29 
   In interviews, some city planners acknowledged the adverse impact of the public land 
sales. By raising the costs of improving urban infrastructure or resolving housing problems, 
these sales aggravated the land problems. It is said that these sales gave opportunities for the 
prime minister and other politicians to raise political funds. They reveal a lack of good 
judgment and no sense of public responsibility on the part of policyinakers as providers of 
                                                                            30 public goods. Again, reckless bank lending fueled speculation and land price spiral. 
   The case represents a general pattern and reveals the unchanging mentality and 
"ideology" of the main actors in land policymaking process in postwar Japan. Before 
proceeding further on this topic, let us briefly look at the consequences of the land boom. 
That will help us understand why serious attempts to solve land problems, which were bound 
to inflict huge and unpredictable costs on the otherwise well performing economy, have 
repeatedly been postponed. 
   As emergency measures, the government resorted, first, to regulatory measures and tax 
and monetary policies. The Ministry of Finance resorted to administrative guidance to 
restrain bank lending for speculative real estate deals, later expanding its guidance to 
nonbank financial institutions, which had often been used as media to evade MOF 
supervision. 
    To explore longer-range vision and policies, following Tanaka administration's precedent 
after the archipelago remodeling boom, the Nakasone government created an Advisory 
Council on Land Policy, Tochi Rincho, in August 1987 and enacted another law, the Basic 
land law, in December 1989. 
   The goal of the Basic Land Law was to establish the guiding principles on land policy 
and to foster national consensus on the public nature of land. Soon after its passage, the 
Ministerial Conference on Land Policy announced ten priority policy measures to be 
implemented: (1) increasing housing and residential land in the large metropolitan areas, (2) 
comprehensive review of land tax system, (3) development of nuclear business centers (gYOMU 
kaku toshi) and bay areas, (4) efficient use of national and public land, (5) review of rental 
house and land laws, (6) restraining speculative land transactions, (7) improving the public 
land evaluation system, (8) returning developmental interest to society, (9) improving 
                                                                     31 information disclosure on land, (10) public education on the concept of land. 
    To prevent recurrence of destructive land price booms, the basic law assumed that it is 
imperative to reform the absolutist notion of property right long-held by both leaders and the 
public in Japan. Thus, the law declared that public welfare takes precedence over the 
principle of private property ownership, that land-use should be planned, and that land[ 
speculation should be controlled. It also enunciated the principle of "betterment levies," 1. e.,. 
taxation of development-derived gains.32 
    As a compromise between conflicting interests represented on the advisory council the 
basic land law incorporated portion of minority opinions. Its pronounced intent was to foster a
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consensus on a more activist government land policy and to educate policyrnakers, 
businessmen, and the general public in the social responsibility that accompanies property 
ownership. But as critics point out, its effectiveness is in question. The law is declaratory in 
character and lacks power to force change in the existing laws and regulations of lower order. 
It remains to be seen if the government can enforce policies that either limit property rights or 
change the almost monomaniacal desire for owning land that is prevalent in society and 
thereby break the vicious circle based on the myth of infinitely rising land prices. 
E. Post-Bubble Period: 1990 -
   During 1991, according to the National Land Agency, the residential land prices fell 5.6% 
on average nationwide. This was the first decline since 1974. Prices in the greater Tokyo, 
Osaka and Nagoya areas declined 12.5%. The basic reason of the drop of the land prices was 
that they had reached the ceiling where supply exceeded demand. Also, the stock market crash 
reduced the asset base of the financial institutions and their client companies substantially 
thus disrupting the capital flow into real estate investment.33 
   If the market forces were the reason for reversing the trend, does the fundamental 
structure of Japan's land standard system remain unchanged? What was the impact of the 
government policies in bringing down the land prices? Another important question to be 
examined is the impact of the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks that began in 
September 1989. 
   American negotiators in that talk shifted attention from the Japanese government's trade 
policies to structural 49 elements", such as socioeconomic conditions, habits, and customs, that 
appear to compel Japanese citizens to save rather than spend. They argued that (1) high land 
prices force consumers to save excessively and limit consumption and imports; (2) they retard 
housing and public works investments and dampen their multiplier effects on domestic 
demand; and (3) prohibitive land costs pose a formidable obstacle to entry of foreign business 
into Japanese markets. 34 They demanded the Japanese government to adopt: (1) measures to 
increase housing land and housing units in the metropolitan areas; (2) a comprehensive tax 
reform that will remove preferential taxes for farmers, increase property (fixed asset) tax in 
general, and reduce the prohibitive capital gains tax on land sales so as to increase land 
supply and thereby to reduce land prices; (3) utilization of idle or underutilized public land-, 
(4) stepped-up investment in public works to improve the infrastructure; (5) revision of land 
and house lease laws to give landowners incentives to build more rental properties; (6) 
deregulation of certain types of zoning and construction (especially, height control and 
46 sunshine") rules to increase high-rise construction; and (7) rationalization of the land value 
                                 35 assessment for various tax purpos s. , 
   In compiling these demands, the Treasury Department staff at the American Embassy in 
Tokyo drew ideas from the Second Maekawa Report. Also they consulted with Japanese 
economists and media reports and publications.36 
   Since the SII negotiation was started in the summer of 1989, the Japanese government 
has reformed the land tax system, revised the land and house lease laws, changed land use 
                                        1-173
regulations, conducted surveys and introduced a new system for identifying and better 
utilizing idle or underutilized public land, and expanded the budget on infrastructure building 
to induce an increased supply of housing land, all to boost the supply and more efficient use 
of land. It is clear that the American pressure played an important role in the Japanese policy 
making process. The impact of these policies on the land prices, however, seems secondary, at 
beSt.37 They have not changed the basic structure of the Japanese system characterized as the 
land standard system, as will be analyzed below. 
   Land Use Policy and Land Price Management 
   In a market economy, land price changes can be explained mainly by changes in demand 
and supply in the land market caused by industrialization and urbanization, which in turn 
affect the degree of centralization or decentralization in the distribution of population and 
industry. The effectiveness of government control over these long- term developments is 
generally limited in free-market economies. 
   Three other factors more directly influence land price by affecting its demand or supply: 
(1) government-imposed control on land development, (2) taxation, and (3) speculation. 
Although speculation is caused by market forces and constrained by the availability of 
finance, the state can influence it through zoning regulations, national development plans, and 
taxing profits. The state can use more direct control measures like a freeze on land prices and 
more indirect measures of fiscal and monetary policy. 
   West Germany, which undertook postwar reconstruction of its economy and cities in 
conditions comparable to, or worse than, conditions in Japan, has nonetheless succeeded in 
controlling the rise in land prices mainly by controlling development. The government zoned 
enough land for development and developed it as quickly as possible. In Britain, strict 
enforcement of zoning for the sake of preservation of countryside and planned large-scale 
development were the two key elements of its land policy. The land-hoarding tax was also 
used to force landowners to part with unused property. 
   By contrast, the Japanese government tried to control land prices by decentralizing 
industry and population. Only after it proved a complete failure in the mid-1960s, the LDP 
government turned to city planning and other land use policies. 
                                                                     38    By then, however, the "land-standard" had been firmly established. The land price 
inflation of the late 1980s was consistent with a long-term cyclical pattern of steady increases 
in land prices punctuated by periodic price surges, like those in the early 1950s, 1960s, and 
1970s. Because the "land- standard" system worked so well for economic policy goals, a series 
of belated attempts made since the late 1960s to control land price inflation proved no more 
than temporary stopgaps. 
   This system was supported, by three pillars: a myth of continuous rise of land prices, a 
collateral system that turns the latent value of land assets into real financial capital, and 
government monetary policy oriented toward corporate finance in benign neglect of the
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interests of consumers and individual savers. 
   What is striking about Japan's postwar land policy is the government's slow, half-hearted 
response to urban problems and the salience of conflicting interests that account for it. 
   The government failure to demarcate different land markets for residential, agricultural, 
commercial, and industrial uses during the period of rapid urbanization led to chaotic land 
development in and around Tokyo and other major cities. Individual buyers of housing land 
had to compete with corporate buyers of commercial or industrial land in the same market. 
The situation naturally benefited those with large capital and assets at the expense of average 
urban workers, who were pressed to save for the purchase of a house or housing land. The 
high rate of household savings served as the main source of industrial capital to fuel the 
engine of Japan's economic miracle machine. Thus, through its inaction in land use policy 
proper and action in fiscal and monetary policy, the Japanese state helped promote economic 
growth. The chaotic urbanization, however, has proved to be an obstinate burden dragging 
down the quality of life of urban dwellers in that cities once built are difficult, if not 
impossible, to remodel according to changing income or lifestyles. 39 Also, the rate of increase 
in wages and consumption of the work force in Japan was significantly lower than that of the 
country's economic growth. The land price hike at the rate several times higher than that of 
wage increase played a key role in maintaining this system. 
   The state's actions related to land use taken after late 1960s did inject some measures of 
order but failed to make clear demarcation of land markets. Furthermore, various government 
projects and land- use regulations provided politicians of all levels with illicit but highly 
lucrative fund raising opportunities through such actions as buying up the land designated for 
public works projects (such as building roads, bridges, railways, harbor, industrial parks, etc.) 
before their public announcement. The so-called tochl-korogashl (land- rolling) accompanying 
this kind of practice was another common cause of land price hikes. This system could 
function because not only corporations but also the majority of the people became involved in 
speculative land purchases. People often bought land as the best means to make quick and 
sure capital gains rather than for just building a house for living. The state action thus not 
only fail to destroy but helped perpetuate the land myth 40 
   Here, it is important to note the trade-off between efficiency and equity involved in land 
                                                            41 policy as in any public policy involvingresourceallocation. Corresponding to these two 
values are two sets of goals for land policy, one economic and the other social. The two are 
mutually reinforcing in some areas but are incompatible or contradictory in many other issue 
areas. In most Western nations where urbanization has occurred in limited land areas as in 
Japan, social policy goals have generally dominated land policy making, and governments 
have often intervened in the land market for the sake of equity and public welfare. In Japan, 
by contrast, the goal of economic efficiency goal has been dominant in government policies, 
including those related to land-use patterns and land-price changes. 
    In explaining the government's single-minded focus on economic growth that led to 
chaotic urbanization and land price hikes, critics often blame the lack of a vision and political
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leadership. The weak leadership was certainly an important factor, but visions and policy 
proposals did exist. They were aborted by pressures from various groups while citizens 
remained too preoccupied with making ends meet to demand amenity in the urban 
environment. 
   The changes occurred only when the urban citizenry began to complain vocally about 
such unwelcome costs of extremely fast industrialization as pollution, overcongestion, and 
high land prices and poor housing conditions in the late 1960s. It was not until then that the 
concepts of city planning and amenity became recognized and accepted by the general public, 
although those concepts had existed among some bureaucrats and politicians as well as city 
planners and experts. What motivated citizens' movement before was mainly NIMBYism, i.e., 
"build it
, but not in my backyard," which seldom extended beyond narrow neighborhood 
concerns. 
   Japan's land policy-making process has been flawed with fragmentation of jurisdiction 
among ministries and agencies at the national level, and domination by the well-organized 
groups of farmers and construction and real estate industries, as well as the general influence 
of the business and financial communities. These interest groups are all well connected to the 
Liberal Democratic Party's "construction tribe" members and relevant departments and 
sections of the bureaucracy, forming iron triangles that dominate Japan's policy making 
process. Policies on public works, which have been one of the most important factors 
determining land price and land use in various localities in Japan, have been made through 
the negotiation among relevant iron triangles. Under these circumstances, the state's 
intervention in the market tends to produce a land use policy to serve special interests often 
at odds with public welfare. 
   Land price inflation and irrational land use were aggravated also by the lack of 
information on the land market and the lack of transparency in the land policy making 
process. Not only has the government reluctant to disclose information on land transactions 
but also has the ministerial sectionalism prevented the government from collecting accurate 
data on land ownership and transactions. 
   Another problem revealed in the above review is overconcentration of land use policy-
making power in the hands of the national government ministries and concomitant lack of 
local autonomy. Local governments have often been the major source of innovation in land 
use policy, and demonstrated their ability to adopt more flexible land use policies that are 
suited to local conditions than the central government. On balance, however, the system has 
tended to stifle such local initiatives. 
]I[ . Conclusion 
   As a result of these characteristics of the government, land has become a key factor in 
preserving what may be called Japan's neo-social dumping system - a system that promotes 
exports by keeping lower real wages and higher household savings rates than those prevailing 
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in most advanced industrial economies of the West. The high savings rate reinforces the 
export drive by providing capital for productive investment as well as generating export 
pressure by reducing the level of domestic consumption. Japan's export drive is very hard to 
tame because this neo-social dumping system is embedded in the kaleidoscopic urbanization 
patterns that are impossible to undo or rectify expeditiously. Thus, the yen will keep 
appreciating to bloat Japan's GNP to the stratospheric level. 
   A rupture to this export driven economy will be wrought by the global market forces 
generated in reaction to this social dumping system. The SII negotiation and its aftermath 
reflect the impact of such forces wrought indirectly by the US government. The massive 
transfer of manufacturing bases abroad is driven directly by the market forces that keep 
driving up the value of the yen. In addition to deindustrialization, the "quality of life" gaps 
may drive Japanese with skills and talents to move out of the country in search for better life. 
Not only production sites but R & D bases may be transferred overseas in an accelerated 
pace. National boundaries may not disappear but the grip of the state over those mobile 
individuals and companies would weaken and so would its influence over the market. 
   These global forces, rather than the states' actions and negotiations, will eventually pull 
the countries of similar economic standing toward a state of equilibrium, not only in the 
quantitative but also qualitative terms by synchronizing social and economic conditions of the 
industrialized nations. Life-styles and values, even those fostered within unique cultural 
tradition, tend to acquire similar patterns with the advance of communications technology. 
Eventually, the Japanese policy and policy-making framework will have to change to prevent 
deindustrialization and brain drain as the people become increasingly exposed to the global 
             42 market forces. 
   To fill the void left by the relocation of factories, again, market forces may well direct 
domestic capital into investment in housing and infrastructure building to improve the quality 
of life of the ordinary Japanese. The government will be compelled to follow such market 
trend to shift its focus onto investment in building long-neglected public goods. In the final 
analysis, it will be pressure emanating from the global market that eventually eradicates the 
neo-social dumping system in Japan .43 
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